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The new terrorist insurgencies globally, as well as in Africa, are defined by the exclusivity 
of their highly partisan “sectarian 
objectives”, as opposed to the 
“public good” and the deviation of 
their methodologies from humanistic 
underpinnings to the expression of 
hatred of apostates who do not share 
their fundamentalist spiritual craze. In 
essence, these sectarian insurgences 
defy all conventional definitions of 
revolutionary praxis and struggle. 
The emergence of the Islamic State 
of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) epitomises 
this state of affairs and represents the 
clearest challenge to the concept of a 
harmonic convergence drawn on the 
limited experience of Euro-America. 
ISIL claims religious authority over all 
Muslims across the world and aspires 
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to bring much of the Muslim-inhabited 
regions of the world under its political 
control, beginning with Iraq, Syria and 
other territories in the Levant region, 
which includes Jordan, Israel, Palestine, 
Lebanon, Cyprus and part of southern 
Turkey. The global implications of 
the horror that such movements as 
al-Qaeda and its off shoots, the ISIL, 
whether in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, 
Libya, Mali or Nigeria, has awakened 
the world to the sheer futility and falsity 
of denominating the grand narratives 
of the evolution of human society as an 
exclusively a Euro-American affair. 
The world of the totality of 
humanity matters. This global society 
must count in any propagation of any 
perceived harmonic convergences that 
must undergird global stability and 
order. For Africa, the consequences of 
this have not brought happy news. In 
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
this intersection with al-Shabaab has 
had a worrisome impact. Nigeria, in its 
debilitating confrontations with Boko 
Haram, is the poster image of Africa’s 
continuing dangerous rendezvous 
with global history. It is a nation in 
double jeopardy emanating from the 
continuing denial of establishment 
Euro-America to the reality that 
although immediate local conditions, 
as in most of the Islamic world, may 
have enabled the rise of Boko Haram, 
its emergence is undeniably a part of 
the instability of the global landscape.
Danjibo elaborates on 
fundamentalism in relation to Boko 
Haram and other extremist insurgencies. 
He defines fundamentalism as an 
eclectic concept that can be viewed 
from three perspectives: (i) from a 
cognitive understanding where the 
work is associated with a closed 
type that expresses exclusivity, 
particularity, literality and moral 
rigour; (ii) from a cultural theological 
framework where the work expresses 
opposition to religious and cultural 
liberalism in defence of orthodoxy 
and religious traditions; and (iii) 
from a social movement perspective, 
fundamentalism denotes organisational 
and ideological uniqueness from other 
types of religious movements. Religious 
fundamentalism is a microscopic but 
also a literal understanding of religious 
practices and teachings, especially in 
its relation to the direct transliteration 
of the Holy Scriptures and its 
insistence on the sacred perpetuation 
of the traditions. In other words, 
fundamentalists stress “authority of 
scripture and the necessity of righteous 
living”.  They also place great emphasis 
on “right doctrine and the necessity of 
organised warfare against the forces of 
modernism”.  It is in this context that 
the Maitatsine and Boko Haram may be 
understood as fundamentalist reactions 
to the Nigerian state and the global 
order that it perceives to be dominantly 
western and by implication, Christian. 
Danjibo stresses the global nexus 
of Nigerian religious practice and 
organisation. He is emphatic that 
Nigerian Muslim organisations and the 
Christian counterparts are linked to the 
Middle East and the West respectively. 
The former look up to the Arab world 
for religious alliance while the latter 
tilt toward the Euro-American pole.1 
This broad polarisation of Nigeria was 
demonstrated in the sharp divisions 
that the American invasion of Iraq 
elicited in the country. In northern 
Nigeria some youth were explicitly 
supportive of Saddam Hussein, while 
local militias rose from parts of the 
south as volunteers for the American 
side. 
African religious bodies, including 
fundamentalist Muslim and Christian 
groups, are tightly linked to global, 
mainly western and mid-eastern, 
religious networks and tend to become 
local extensions of the theological 
predilections and orientations of their 
metropolitan guides and allies. Boko 
Haram and al-Shabaab typify this. 
They draw much of their inspiration 
and adopt and adapt tactics from 
the fundamentalist directions of such 
organisations as al-Qaeda and ISIL. 
ISIL is a radical Islamist group 
noted for its extremely brutal tactics - 
including mass killings and abductions 
of members of religious and ethnic 
minorities, as well as the beheadings 
of soldiers and journalists. It has seized 
large swathes of territory in eastern Syria 
and across northern and western Iraq 
that it has declared an Islamic state. Its 
brutal methods have sparked fear and 
outrage across the world and prompted 
western military intervention.2 Boko 
Haram has deepened its connection 
to ISIS by forming an information and 
material-support alliance and have 
been sharing military strategy. With 
the same basic ideology and similar 
objectives as ISIS, Boko Haram has 
been integrated into the larger global 
jihadist agenda to impose shariah law 
everywhere through the creation of 
caliphates in the Muslim world. They 
share the same operational philosophy 
in the use of terror to advance their 
fundamentalist cause and the more 
violence they can inflict on the infidels, 
the better, as far as they’re concerned.3 
The use of terror, including the 
slaughtering of infidels and apostates, 
kidnappings of civilians and mass 
abductions, forced marriages and 
gang rapes of girls and women, is an 
expression of deeply held contempt for 
the extant social order. These shocking 
tactics are also aimed at breaking 
infidel communities and demonstrating 
their powerlessness in the face of the 
unimaginable aggression of the Islamic 
extremists. These horrendous crimes 
are associated with the asymmetric 
warfare that they unleash at all 
levels of their campaigns; against the 
individual, community, national armies 
or international coalitions arrayed 
against their insurgencies. Their wars 
are not mediated by any rules. It is war 
unlimited in the middle-east, in Africa, 
in Asia and across Europe and America. 
The charismatic Muslim cleric, 
Mohammed Yusuf, formed Boko 
Haram in Maiduguri in 2002. Boko 
Haram’s official Arabic name is 
Jama'atuAhlisSunnaLidda'awatiwal-
Jihad, which in English means "People 
Committed to the Propagation of 
the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad”. 
In northern  
Nigeria some youth 
were explicitly 
supportive of Saddam 
Hussein, while local 
militias rose from 
parts of the south as 
volunteers for the 
American side. 
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Translated from the Hausa language, 
that is spoken across northern Nigeria, 
Cameroun, Niger Republic, Ghana and 
Tchad, Boko Haram means literally 
"Western education is forbidden". The 
organisation draws its fighters mainly 
from the Kanuri ethnic group, which 
is the largest in the three states of 
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe that are 
the epicentres of their operations in 
Nigeria. But the group recruits from 
and operates in northern Nigeria and 
Cameroon from where Mohammed 
Marwa, the leader of Boko Haram’s 
antecedent group, Mai Tatsine, 
hailed, Niger and Tchad. However, 
its main theatre of operations has 
been in north eastern Nigeria which 
has common borders with Cameroon 
where the group has declared an 
Islamic Caliphate. Boko Haram’s main 
political objective is to upend the 
Nigerian social order, overturn the 
secular character of the Nigerian state 
that it has repudiated in favour of the 
institution of an Islamic fundamentalist 
society in a theocratic state.
Boko Haram was reincarnated 
from the ashes of an earlier violent 
religious sect, Mai Tatsine. Mai Tatsine 
is translated from Hausa as “people 
who curse”. The group got its name 
from the notoriety of its preaching 
that were mainly diatribes and insults 
to the social, traditional and political 
establishment as well as the community 
at large. Indeed, it was reputed for its 
hatred of the immediate community in 
which the sect was founded and based. 
The spiritual leader of the movement 
was Muhammad Marwa a.k.a. Mai 
Tatsine. 
The origins of the movement 
are shrouded in some controversy 
as some claimed that Muhammed 
Marwa was one of five Christian 
students  sponsored by the Christian 
Association in the northern Nigeria, 
in Jos, in 1954 to study Islamic studies 
in Sudan.  Their mission was to come 
back to Nigeria as Muslim clerics, use 
their Islamic knowledge to preach 
violence, distort original Islamic 
teachings and, if possible, cause riots 
and chaos in northern Nigeria. Two of 
the five provocateurs, this version goes, 
returned to execute the original plan; 
Muhammad Marwa deployed in Kano, 
in northern Nigeria, while the second, 
simply identified as Birema, settled in 
Niamey in neighboring Niger Republic. 
Mai Tatsine, which began its reign 
in the late ’50s in Kano and some 
other parts of Northern Nigeria, 
is the forerunner of Boko Haram. 
Their ideologies are similar. In their 
fundamentalist orientation they 
forbade what Islam allowed, and 
allowed what Islam made haram. 
They claimed western education is 
sin, they rejected anything brought by 
technology, they were constantly saying 
things like “wearing a wrist watch is 
haram, using radios and television is 
haram”..4 Notwithstanding the very 
tenacious engagement to propagate 
fundamentalist Islam in Nigeria the 
loss of lives in radical and militant 
confrontations with the government, 
some indeed still believed Mohammed 
Marwa remained a Christian until his 
death. In the often strange contortions 
that Nigeria’s political process can 
take, whatever his true belief, Marwa’s 
influence remains indelible in the 
character of Islamic fundamentalist 
insurgencies that has emerged in the 
country. 
Meanwhile, Boko Haram has 
developed strong global networks 
that have complemented its 
fundamentalism with a murderous 
mindset that has been demonstrated in 
its genocidal proclivities.
The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin 
– commonly known as al-Shabaab, is 
in the same category. Al-Shabaab is 
a clan-based insurgent and terrorist 
group and was the militant wing of the 
Somali Council of Islamic Courts that 
took over most of southern Somalia in 
the second half of 2006. Al Shabaab 
was co-founded by Adan Hashi 
Ayrow, its first spiritual leader, and 
Ahmed Abdi Godane, under whom 
the hard-line Islamic militant group 
linked with global jihadist movements. 
Although most of its fighters are alleged 
to be predominantly interested in the 
nationalistic battle against the Somali 
Federal Government, al-Shabaab’s 
senior leadership is affiliated with 
al-Qaeida and are believed to have 
trained and fought in Afghanistan. 
The merger of the two groups was 
publicly announced in February 2012 
by the Emir of al-Shabaab and Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeida.5 Its 
most recent leader, Abdi Godani, 33, 
was killed in an American air raid on 
1 September, 2014. Personifying the 
religious extremism of the group, he 
declared that had been sent “ahead of 
the hour with the sword so that Allah 
will be worshipped alone without 
partners”. He became Emir [an Arabic 
word for leader] of al-Shabaab, a 
title that conferred him great spiritual 
clout. He became in effect the chief 
ideologue, custodian and interpreter of 
the 'pure' Salafi jihadi doctrine.6 
Yet, against this background is the 
irreconcilable lifestyle of the leadership 
of the fundamentalist groups, whether 
in the Middle East or Nigeria, with 
the fundamentalist and anti-western 
preachments. In Nigeria, it was 
observed that Mohammed Yusuf, the 
founder of Boko Haram, rode in exotic 
cars, including expensive jeeps, and 
enrolled his children in choice private 
schools and was attended to by private 
lawyers and doctors. Boko Haram is 
distinguished by both its objectives of 
establishing a fundamentalist exclusivist 
state and by its brutal methods. It is 
its inhuman methods that qualify it 
as a terroristic movement even if its 
objectives are to delegitimise an extant 
order or status quo. 
Unlike Africa’s classic revolutions, 
terrorist insurgencies are inhuman 
and positively inhumane. A salient 
conclusion is the dehumanisation and 
brutalisation of those who are perceived 
to be infidels or apostates in the 
terrorist campaigns by extremist Islamic 
insurgencies. This separates extremists 
from authentic African revolutionary 
movements that promote humanistic 
tenets as core to the integrity of the 
ultimate transformation of society that 
they seek to attain. Rebellions often 
have certain affinities or claims to 
revolutions but they belong to different 
classes in the scope and depth of their 
challenge to the status quo. In fact 
many rebellions are integral to the 
status quo, but have specific grouses. 
A rebellion is often relatively limited 
in the ends it may seek to attain. The 
scope of the changes that are sought 
may not necessarily lead to the birth 
of a new order. Indeed it may be the 
search for accommodation by the 
rebels in the status quo. 
A coup d’etat may be a rebellion, 
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but a secessionist bid comes closer to a 
revolution, while a liberation war such 
as the process led by the South Sudan 
Liberation Army (SPLA) represents a 
revolutionary process, particularly if 
the vision of post liberation society is 
based on radically different ideational 
premises.
 The goals envisaged by the use of 
political violence determine the nature 
of the process, including the intensity of 
the force that the process may apply. A 
revolution is thus a rebellion in extreme 
dedicated to the complete overthrow of 
a hegemonic order, which may include 
armed struggle for independence by 
colonial peoples from a colonising 
regime or secession by a people 
who seek to free themselves from an 
oppressive authority. A coup d’etat 
is often a minimalist rebellion whose 
limited goals may range from the total 
disavowal of the extant political, social 
and economic order to seeking radical 
restructuring of the order, to even a 
mild reform of the status quo. These 
goals may be described as minimalist, 
since they do not seek to reject the 
foundational principles underpinning 
the prevailing systemic order. A 
revolution is an absolute rejection of 
the very principles undergirding an 
existing order and often entails intense 
violence to overthrow the entrenched 
order. 
Revolutionary and rebel movements 
sometimes may bring together, at least 
at the core of the leadership hierarchy, 
rational actors who have a clear set of 
political goals that are perceived to be 
best attainable through the application 
of force. In the least, therefore, 
revolutionary and rebel movements 
must be able to project force. They 
must also convince the status quo that 
they possess such capabilities to be 
credible. Revolutions seek systemic 
power transitions, social transformation 
and transformations in economic 
relations of power. Rebellions may aim 
for less having failed in the deployment 
of persuasive means to achieve change 
or reform. 
The legion of rebel movements in 
West Africa include the Movement of 
Democratic Forces of the Casamance 
(MFDC), the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL) and its splinter group 
the Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (INPFL) as well as 
United Liberia Movement (ULIMO) 
or the Liberia United Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) as well as 
the Liberia Peace Council (LPC)  in 
Liberia, the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the 
Force Nouvelles in Cote d’Ivoire that 
transformed itself into Cote d’Ivoire’s 
post conflict national army. 
The trajectory of the Forces 
Nouvelles from a clannish rebel 
force to becoming the rechristened 
national army, Force Republicaines 
du Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI) presents a 
classic example of the evolution of  a 
contemporary rebel organisation against 
the state with its international backers; 
the neo–colonial power deploying 
the rebellion as a proxy to achieve its 
strategic objectives. It started as a band 
of disgruntled non-commissioned 
officers led by I. B. Koulibali, later to 
be murdered by the pro-France, pro 
Blaise Compaore Guillaume Soro 
faction of the rebellion, that acting 
with the support of the Burkinabe 
government, mutinied in September 
2002 and sought the overthrow of 
the emerging neo-nationalist Laurent 
Gbagbo Ivorian state. Pushed out of 
the capital Abidjan, the group was, 
with the encouragement of French 
Foreign Minister Dominique de 
Villipen, officially transformed into a 
formal rebellion by the help of French 
forces 23rd BIMA based in Abidjan, 
which created a buffer zone to protect 
the rebels. The French sabotaged 
sub-regional efforts to negotiate a 
resolution of the crisis. It put in place 
a Linas-Marcoussis process designed to 
advance its planned strategic objective 
of installing a French local proxy and 
overseer of its Ivorian affairs. This came 
to fruition in the controversial takeover 
of the country a decade after through 
elections that were clearly lost by the 
local patron of the rebellion and the 
proxy of France, Alhasane Ouattara. 
Again in neighbouring Liberia, rebels 
were on hand to advance France’s 
agenda to the detriment of Africa. 
Charles Taylor’s horrendous NPFL was 
aided by the collusion of Burkinabe 
and Ivorian governments to overthrow 
the brutal regime of Samuel Doe. The 
role of Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire 
under Houphouet Boigny was partly 
to derail gains in what was perceived 
as the Nigeria led regional integration 
project of ECOWAS. The political 
objective of the two states was to align 
the geo strategic interests of France 
to consolidate its formal hegemonic 
status in Africa. Toward this goal, it 
was crucial to keep the Francophone/
Anglophone divide in West Africa and 
strengthen exclusivist Francophone 
socio/political and economic platforms 
against the Anglophones. The price 
of support for Charles Taylor was the 
deployment of its forces to assassinate 
Thomas Sankara, the revolutionary and 
charismatic young leader of Burkina 
Faso, who was betrayed by his deputy 
Blaise Compaore. Charles Taylor in 
turn was on hand as an accomplice to 
the genocidal war of Fonday Sankor’s 
RUF against Sierra Leone. Cote d’Ivoire 
under Houphouet Boigny and Blaise 
Compaore’s Burkina Faso had been the 
centres of the strategic destabilisation 
that tore apart the social fabric of West 
Africa for two decades.  
From the early sixties, political 
violence has gradually escalated both 
in its intensity and the frequency of 
its occurrence across the sub region. 
In Nigeria, it is estimated that 10,000 
people have been killed in political 
violence in the last three years. Since 
the last decade, West Africa has been 
characterised by an unbroken arch 
of conflicts that stretches for over a 
thousand miles from the West to the 
East of the sub region. This arc begins 
from Senegal through Guinea Bissau 
across Sierra Leone, Liberia to Cote 
d’Ivoire. In more recent times, Mali 
and Nigeria have been linked to this 
arc of sub-regional instability. The 
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countries share close proximity and 
three of them have contiguous borders. 
Cultural affinities of the various peoples 
of the sub region also flow across 
international frontiers. These affinities 
have had implications for the spread of 
political violence. 
The prominent use of violence to 
achieve political ends in the region 
began in 1963 with the assassination 
of Togolese premier Sylvanus Olympio 
by ex-soldiers that toppled his 
government. In neighbouring Ghana 
in February 1966, President Kwame 
Nkrumah was overthrown by Colonels 
Afrifa and Kotoka. Massive violence 
in western Nigeria foreshadowed 
the military insurrection of majors 
that overthrew the Tafawa Balewa 
government in 1966. By 1967, the 
federal government was embroiled 
in a civil war to put down the Col 
Odumegwu Ojukwu led self-declared 
state of Biafra. That conflict is reputed 
to have claimed over 1 million lives. 
The Movement of Democratic Forces 
in the Casamance (MFDC), led by 
Abbe Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, 
launched a secessionist bid from 
Senegal in 1982. Thirty-two years later, 
a low intensity conflict still simmers in 
that province. 
In 1999, civil conflict in Guinea 
Bissau, which had fought a historic 
revolutionary war of liberation for 
over 12 years, led to the violent 
overthrow of the General Bernandino 
Vieira regime by his Chief of Defence 
Staff, General Ansumane Mane. In a 
stark deviation from the revolutionary 
guidelines of Amilcar Cabral, General 
“Nino” Viera had exploited racial 
antipathies to overthrow Louis Cabral 
from office in 1980. Vieira, a Papel, 
who returned to office through the 
ballot box in 2005, was killed by 
renegade Ballanta soldiers on 2 March 
2009, apparently in retaliation for a 
bomb blast that killed Guinea-Bissau's 
military chief General Batista Tagme 
Na Waie, a Ballanta. Viera was accused 
of planting the bombs. The troubled 
Lusophone country in the sub region 
shares contiguous borders in the north 
with the South of the Casamance, and 
it was admitted that the civil conflict 
was perceived as directly related to the 
international politics of the insurgency 
in the Casamance. In November 2000, 
head of the military junta, General 
Ansumane Mane took up arms against 
the democratically elected President 
Kumba Yala. In September 2003, 
remnants of the old military junta 
finally deposed the President.
In spiralling violence in the sub 
region, by November 2003, Liberia 
had been at war for over 24 years. It 
began with the Samuel Doe’s bloody 
“revolution” in April 1980 that resulted 
in the assassination of President 
William Tolbert at the hand of private 
Harrison Pennoh.7 Within one month 
of taking over the entire cabinet of 
President Tolbert had been put to 
death. Thereafter many others were 
brutally eliminated including General 
Thomas Quinwokpa on charges of 
coup plotting. In December 1989, the 
Charles Taylor led National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Nimba 
county of Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire.8 
Since then, the Liberian state has 
imploded and had been reconstituted 
through mainly sub-regional efforts. 
Doe’s death sparked hellish tribal 
and factional fighting.9 As a result 
of new insurgency from another 
rebel movement, Liberia United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), 
Charles Taylor was forced into exile in 
Nigeria and the country has imploded 
again. The intractable crises spawned 
numerous militias and chaos elements 
that controlled different parts of the 
country. The post Taylor transitional 
administration was protected by the 
ECOWAS sub regional intervention 
force and the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) until a democratically 
elected government led by President 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf came into office. 
In Sierra Leone, from 1991 
army corporal Fonday Sankoh’s 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
with the unwavering support of 
Charles Taylor,10 took up arms against 
the government of Major General John 
Saidu Momoh. This was in retaliation 
for President Momoh’s hosting of 
Liberia rebels in Sierra Leonian territory. 
In fact, the United Liberia Movement 
of Alhani Kromah and later the 
Liberia United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy, both Mandingo aligned 
rebel movements, were funded and 
created by Mandingos in Sierra Leone 
and Guinea, both sharing contiguous 
borders with Liberia. Two other coups, 
and continuous bloodletting from 
Fonday Sankoh’s armed elements, 
preceded the democratic elections that 
brought John Tejan Kabbah into office. 
The RUF came to the notice of the 
international community by unleashing 
mind-boggling violence against the 
people of Sierra Leone. In September 
2002, in neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire, 
after a very bloody attempt to unseat 
President Laurent Gbagbo, the Patriotic 
Movement of Cote d’Ivoire retreated to 
the central town of Bouake where the 
movement has consolidated its control 
over 65% of the national territory. Like 
Charles Taylor before them, the MPCI 
set up an embryonic state within Cote 
d’Ivoire. As a result of the pervasive 
violence, security became a concern in 
the sub region,11 as it was awash with 
rebels, militias and chaos elements.
Yet, it is possible, as witnessed in West 
Africa, that legitimate revolutionary 
processes and political rebellions, 
in the hands of unsophisticated and 
crude actors, decay. The decay of 
revolutions may be marked by the 
gradual retrenchment of the hitherto 
lofty original humanistic and altruistic 
goals. In its stead, violence becomes a 
norm and chaos an end in itself. Was 
that the case with Charles Taylor and 
the NPFL that were established to 
end a monstrous dictatorial regime? 
Could also his predecessor Sergeant 
Samuel Doe who, egged on by the 
progressive movement of Liberia, 
rose from the margins of society to 
challenge an illegitimate century and 
half old internal apartheid social order 
superintended by the True Whig party, 
The proliferation  
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who delineate their 
territorial spheres of 
control and stake their 
claims as the political 
sovereigns of those 
states.
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lost the will to pursue a constructive 
revolutionary path? 
Further still, it is critical to delineate 
between rebellions and militias and 
chaos elements. Rebel movements 
are characterised by their amorphous 
structure. While a tightly knit corps of 
conspirators may serve as the nucleus, 
the nature of the enterprise cannot 
sustain a formal and institutionalised 
organisation in the very beginnings 
of rebellion. While a hierarchy may 
exist, it is the exigencies of the struggle 
that determines the distribution of 
responsibilities and power within 
the organisation. The leadership 
may be constituted by mostly 
non-commissioned officers taking 
important decisions, often with only a 
few commissioned officers. 
Rebel armies are risk acceptant, 
largely because their operations are 
opportunistically determined and 
have no distinct political control. 
The political leadership is fused with 
military command. There is therefore 
no superintending higher political 
authority with oversight. This implies 
that rebel armies are not accountable. 
The lack of control and accountability 
is more acute at the beginning of the 
campaigns of the movement. One 
reason for this is that rebel armies, by 
their very aims, seek to destroy the basis 
of the social contract and the subsisting 
social order between the governing 
elite and the governed. While the goal 
of the military establishment may be 
to protect the integrity of the state, the 
territory and its institutions, the goal of 
the rebellion is to destroy this. 
Generally conflict in Africa is 
impacted by transnational sociological 
affinities across the continent. The 
crisis crossing of cultural affinities 
across national frontiers implies 
that while rebellion may have been 
motivated by both political and 
economic interests and developments 
internal to one country, the internal 
interests may impact on groups that are 
not direct participants in the process. 
The conflicts thus invite the attention 
of ethnic cousins across the borders. 
In this scenario that may be described 
as intermestic, transnational interest 
groups may be motivated to join a 
rebel movement across the border to 
protect perceived corporate interests 
of the transnational ethnic or religious 
groups in the political contentions of 
the conflict. So a significant percentage 
of combatants in rebel movements 
operating in any one country in the sub 
region may come from neighbouring 
states. This is sometimes with the 
connivance of the governments of 
those states. There is thus wide extra 
territorial catchment area for rebel 
groups in the West African sub region. 
These facts were demonstrated 
in Cote d’Ivoire where Burkinabes 
dominated the Ivorian rebel Forces 
Nouvelles, and the Kru/Krahn group 
from Liberia, transnational ethnic 
cousins of Gbagbo Bete group, fought 
on the side of the Laurent Gbagbo 
administration. This situation leads to 
the beginnings of mercenary activities 
as was amply demonstrated by the 
rebel movement RUF in Sierra Leone 
and the incursions of Liberian fighters 
on different sides in the Ivorian civil 
war. If the rebel movement manages 
to discover an internal source of 
generating revenue, a new political 
economy of the war may threaten the 
political focus and may lead to the 
decay of the rebellion. In this case, 
the political economy of the war may 
lead to factionalisation of the rebel 
movement that further complicates the 
intervention process and negotiations 
to bring the conflict to an end. Militias 
often emerge from such further 
splintering of rebellions in decay.
Militias are fairly unstructured 
rabble-rousing armed social groups that 
are often motivated by a very narrow 
agenda, which may not necessarily be 
political. They are often the nucleus 
of military formations in the service 
of one person or at the command of 
one person or an ethnic chieftain. The 
proliferation of militias in unstable states 
may lead to the emergence of warlords 
who delineate their territorial spheres 
of control and stake their claims as 
the political sovereigns of those states. 
Somalia presents an extreme example 
of a failed state carved out among war 
lords backed by heavily armed militias. 
The Democratic Republic of 
Congo has a surfeit of groups that 
typify militias in Africa. It has coined 
the term Mai Mai or Mayi Mayi to 
refer any kind of community-based 
militia group formed to defend their 
local territory against other armed 
groups. Many were established to 
exploit the unending conflicts and war 
for their own advantage by looting, 
cattle rustling or banditry. They also 
extort monies from artisanal miners 
prospecting for minerals in many areas 
where state authority is tenuous or 
non-existent. Small bands of armed 
forces led by warlords, traditional tribal 
elders, village heads, and politically 
motivated resistance fighters fall under 
the term "Mai Mai". Because Mai Mai 
are loosely structured owing loyalty to 
the person of the band leader, internal 
cohesion is fragile. 
Importantly though, different Mai 
Mai groups are allied with a variety 
of domestic and foreign government 
and guerrilla groups at different times. 
The Mai Mai were particularly active 
in the provinces in the east bordering 
Rwanda, North Kivu and South Kivu (the 
"Kivus"), which were under the control 
of the Rwanda-allied Banyamulenge-
dominated rebel faction, the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-
Goma). The two most powerful and 
well-organised Mai Mai groups in the 
Kivus were led by Generals Padiri and 
Dunia, but now there is another Mai 
Mai group which is called Mai-Mai 
Yakutumba which was organised in 
2007 by General Yakutumba. Other 
less prominent Mai Mai groups, include 
the Mudundu 40/Front de Résistance 
et de Défense du Kivu (FRDKI) and 
Mouvement de Lutte contre l'Agression 
au Zaïre/Forces Unies de Résistance 
Nationale contre l'Agression de la 
Républíque Démocratique du Congo 
(MLAZ/FURNAC), were reported to be 
cooperating with the Rwandan military 
and RCD-Goma.12
Meanwhile asymmetric wars have 
become the hallmark of extremist 
movements such as the Boko Haram 
and ISIL. In the last decade, in northern 
Uganda and South Sudan as well as 
along the borders of Congo Kinshasa 
there is the elusive Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA). In Nigeria, it is Boko 
Haram. The defining trait of groups 
engaged in asymmetric warfare is their 
operational resilience, their resoluteness 
and impermeability to sentimental 
pleadings from their enemies that they 
only despise. Unlike rebellions and 
quasi-revolutionary movements that 
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often decay, especially in Africa, those 
mobilised on theocratic foundations 
often fight to the last man standing. It is 
also of note, even if ironically, that these 
violent movements, whether in Iraq, 
Pakistan, Uganda, Somalia or Nigeria, 
also recruit, abduct and indoctrinate 
women and girls to do battle. This 
completes their defiance of orthodoxy 
in all realms. 
Asymmetric warfare is, 
paradoxically, described as conflicts 
where opposing protagonists have 
starkly unequal military resources, and 
the so-called weaker fluid insurgent uses 
unconventional weapons and tactics. 
The unconventional tactics of the 
extremists integrate every conceivable 
form of atrocity; as terrorism, rape of 
men and women alike, abduction and 
conscription and use of child soldiers 
who are indoctrinated, as default 
instruments of conflict. Executions of 
captured enemies and mass slaughter 
of innocent civilians, often tagged as 
unbelievers or apostates, are frequently 
undertaken. 
It appears that abductions, for which 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) first 
and now Boko Haram have become 
notorious, are important to replenish 
the combatant forces and also to build 
the human infrastructure and logistics 
of the insurgency. They also hold 
hostages to extract resources to buy 
weapons and humiliate their victims 
as proxies of their enemy population 
that they despise. Importantly, they are 
also to express contempt for the target 
society that they aim to destroy. Given 
the history of the stout resistance of the 
Chibok community to the penetration 
of Islam all around its locale, the 
humiliation of that target community is 
a plausible explanation for the unusual 
cruelty meted to them by Boko Haram. 
They also exploit the vulnerabilities 
of the enemy, including probing 
opportunities offered by the spatial 
distribution of enemy population, 
exploitation of local affinities, 
deployment gaps and infrastructural 
deficiencies in the opposing army. The 
enemy, the apostate, is then defined 
as anyone, including women, children 
and civilians, who does not profess 
the fundamentalist credo of the mad 
terrorists. Perceived as the “weaker” 
combatants, they use strategy to offset 
deficiencies relative to the larger 
conventional army in quantity or 
quality of military assets.
In a classic scenario, these ferocious 
small forces have often metamorphosed 
from modest beginnings, mobilised 
by fundamentalist religious theology, 
Islamic or Christian, to which they are 
passionately committed and which 
they violently seek to entrench in 
areas under their control. For these 
groups, coercion, preferably gruesome 
death, is the ultimate weapon for 
the propagation of the faith. In their 
confrontations with armies, the 
strategies employed by the terrorist 
side may not necessarily be military 
in form. It is terror inflicted on both 
the uniformed enemy and the civilian 
population that drives home the 
seriousness of the mission for which 
they are ready or indoctrinated to die.
It is important to observe that 
in all cases, the engagements that 
are elicited are not structured as 
conventional rebellions. This new 
kind of unlimited war has become 
the dominant form of conflict in the 
last decade or so mostly in third world 
theatres. In almost all cases, the covert 
and overt coordination of international 
effort from interested parties on both 
sides has been required to advance 
the cause of and also to contain the 
non-state armed movements that are 
involved in asymmetric warfare. This 
is because every one of these conflicts 
is also located within a certain sub 
regional and the larger international 
geo-strategic context.
Within the larger context of 
unmediated and unlimited violence 
generated by the imperatives of clashing 
dominant global systems of thought, 
including incongruent theological 
orientations internal to the so called 
hegemonic faiths, the African state, as 
currently constructed, fractious and 
factionalised, is archaic and unsuited 
to survive. The complexities of the 
internal structure of the African state, 
the configuration of its states system 
and the alignment of transnational 
sociological affinities in this states 
system leave room for opportunistic 
interventions of emergent destructive 
and centrifugal forces; imported forces 
of darkness. Could then this challenging 
reality serve as the motif force to drive 
the formulation of the contours of an 
agreeable post-Mandela continental 
order that should begin with a reformed 
African social ferment undergirded 
by an Africanist afrocentric thought 
system? Could these be distilled as 
the legitimising parameters of a new 
African age? Could all these renaissant 
strides be interventions integral to the 
definition of an inclusive concept of a 
global harmonic convergence within 
the framework of an unending grand 
narrative of the evolution of human 
society? ■  
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Transnational 
interest groups may 
be motivated to join 
a rebel movement 
across the border 
to protect perceived 
corporate interests 
of the transnational 
ethnic or religious 
groups in the political 
contentions of the 
conflict.
